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COMMENTARY
THE MEANING OF EQUALITY
THOMAS NAGEL*
My remarks will not be primarily in response to Professor Freund's
very interesting article, partly because I do not find myself in very
much disagreement with him. But I will take up some of the central
themes that he has introduced-in particular, the point that equality
has many interpretations. There are many different kinds of equality,
and some of the most pressing moral and political problems concern
the priorities among them. I shall also take up the theme that he
broached at the end of his article-how far the pursuit of equality
should be taken when it comes into competition with other values that
are not egalitarian. These are the pressing moral questions about
equality in American legal and political life. What I want to do is to
say what there is in current philosophical thought about ethics that
bears on these questions and how the legal and social problems look
from that standpoint. I should say at the outset that it seems that no
adequate solutions to the fundamental questions that I want to isolate
are currently available.
In this country only a fairly narrow range of the possible ethical posi-
tions about how society should be arranged really come into play in
political debate. As Professor Freund pointed out, equality has by no
means been automatically counted as a good thing or taken as a politi-
cal watchword over the history of human society. But I think that to-
day most people in the United States favor equality in some sense.
None of us, I would guess, are traditional aristocrats. The issue for us,
and the issue in the American political context, is how the ideal of
equality should be interpreted. We want equality, but equality in what
respect? And how important is it?
Roughly, there are three kinds of equality that might be thought to
be important. The most basic, and probably a common denominator in
* Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University. B.A., 1958, Cornell University; B. Phil.,
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American political debate, is equality in the possession of certain
basic rights-what Professor Freund calls the basic liberties-that are
specifically the job of the courts to protect. These are primarily legal
and political equalities. They also include certain equalities of an eco-
nomic nature, but these would be, for example, equality of the right to
make contracts rather than equality in the apportionment of economic
benefits. In this conception the important kinds of equality are equality
of political and legal respect, equality of formal treatment by the insti-
tutions of society, and equality of liberty from certain kinds of en-
croachment or interference, either public or private. A second notion,
somewhat broader than the first, is equality in the possession of basic
rights plus the equal apportionment of certain kinds of benefits that are
also regarded as basic-perhaps basic medical care, basic education,
care for the aged when they are no longer able to work, and fundamen-
tal care for children so that they do not grow up undernourished. The
third, and by far the broadest notion of equality, is the equal apportion-
ment of benefits of all kinds, particularly economic benefits.
Corresponding to these three conceptions of equality are three kinds
of policy, each representing a major position in the American political
spectrum. The three policies, corresponding respectively to the narrow-
est, intermediate, and broadest conceptions of equality, are conserva-
tive, liberal, and social democratic. But these are labels of convenience,
which I shall explain.
The conservative position would hold that the primary egalitarian
function of government is to secure to everyone the basic rights that are
recognized in the Constitution, but not to redistribute benefits in gen-
eral so as to insure that equality is achieved beyond the apportionment
of those rights. Even those rights are challenged sometimes. The re-
cent Skokie case' regarding the Nazi demonstrators shows fairly clearly
that not everyone believes that the right of free speech is one that abso-
lutely everyone has. But by and large it is conceded, and it is probably
the major tenet of the conservative position, that protection of certain
basic rights is something that has to be accorded equally to everyone.
As Professor Freund pointed out, even that is a redistributive policy
because it costs something to insure that everyone has the right to ade-
quate legal representation in court, for example. Guaranteeing these
rights equalizes a situation that would otherwise be unequal. But in
1. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 291 (1978).
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this minimal egalitarian view, which might be called an individualistic
view, redistribution beyond that point is not necessary; it is not even
politically or socially permissible. Other programs have to be justified
on the ground that they benefit everyone, not on the ground that they
produce greater equality. That is why conservatives are not unfavora-
ble to large expenditures for national defense even though it does not
come under the heading of protecting basic individual rights. Perhaps
some economic redistribution to prevent total social disaster would be
justifiable.
The second position in the spectrum is the standard middle-of-the-
road liberal position, according to which it is the business of society to
guarantee both the protection of equal rights and equality of opportu-
nity. To provide equality of opportunity it is necessary to compensate
in some way for the unequal starting points that people occupy, both
socially and economically. In order that everyone has a fair chance, it
is thought necessary to provide a certain degree of support for free
medical care, free higher education, etc., in addition to the protection
of basic equal rights. So the liberal position favors equal rights, equal-
ity of opportunity, and a social minimum of some sort.
The third position is still more egalitarian, and it might be called a
social democratic or left-liberal position. It is exemplified philosoph-
ically by Professor John Rawls, the author of A Theory of Justice,2
whose work to which Professor Freund alluded. And in particular, it is
exemplified by Rawls' so-called "difference principle" according to
which mere equality of opportunity is not equal enough because it al-
lows great differences to emerge from the way in which different people
are able to use the equal opportunities available to them. According to
the difference principle, inequalities (differences) in the distribution of
general economic benefits are justified only if any further reduction
would lower the level of the people at the bottom. This allows inequal-
ities in the economic domain necessary to provide incentives that pro-
duce general prosperity and contribute to everybody's well-being. But
inequalities that produce a spread in which the disadvantages to the
bottom are offset by advantages to those in the middle and at the top
are not permissible, according to the difference principle. This is more
egalitarian than ordinary liberalism because it requires that social ar-
rangements always favor those in the worst position.
2. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Now, this is just a crude outline of three political positions that are in
play in American public debate. But they raise two kinds of funda-
mental philosophical issues. The first is: how great are the moral de-
mands that we, as members of the society, can make on each other and
ask the government to enforce? Are they limited, or are they broad?
And if so, how broad? In this respect, I have ordered the three posi-
tions from the most limited to the most broad.
The position that makes it the business of the coercive power of gov-
ernments to enforce only the basic liberties or the basic rights is
founded on the moral view that what we can claim from one another,
or what we can ask the coercive power of government to force others to
accord to us, is limited to a certain set of basic rights upon which others
may not infringe. But we are not permitted to ask the government to
enforce redistributions that will compensate us for disadvantages that
we may have from birth, or that will provide us with general benefits.
The second and third positions, the liberal position of equality of
opportunity and the more egalitarian difference principle, both main-
tain that it is the business of society to provide benefits beyond protec-
tion against infringement of basic rights. And that depends on the
following moral conception: one moves from basic rights to more gen-
eral benefits by the argument that most of the inequalities that we find
in our society, the really large-scale ones, are due to factors that are
beyond the individual's control. It is not that everything that happens
to a person is beyond his control, but the range of possibilities or likely
courses of life that are open to a given individual are limited to a con-
siderable extent by his birth. They are limited by the economic class
into which he is born, the kind of environment in which he grows up,
the education of his parents, and also by his genetic endowment. In a
society with a competitive economy, where you end up is to some ex-
tent a product of how smart you are and of how well educated you
were as a child. This means that from a moral point of view it is to
some extent arbitrary how the benefits are distributed, and therefore,
there is nothing wrong with the state tinkering with that distribution.
That distribution does not have any moral sanctity of its own, so it is all
right to go against the distribution of benefits to produce a desirable
end.
But it is at that point that the two nonconservative views part com-
pany. And this brings us to the second major philosophical issue un-
derlying the political dispute. The question is: what end is legitimate
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to pursue once we go beyond the protection of basic rights? Is the end
just the general welfare conceived of as the good of the majority, or is
the end itself a kind of economic equality? The dispute between equal-
ity of opportunity and the much stronger egalitarian ideal depends on
that. The philosophical issue here is a rather abstract one. The issue is
whether the moral claims represented by economic needs, for example,
or the desire for a good life, are aggregative or individualized. What has
to be decided about these benefits is whether each person individually
has an inviolable claim of some kind, which is represented by his eco-
nomic needs and which cannot be outweighed by adding together the
lesser claims of a lot of other people, or whether each person's claims
go into the hopper along with those of others to form an aggregate from
which is picked the heaviest overall weight of claims.
Individualized moral claims, the first type, are represented by things
like the basic rights-the right of free speech, for example. If there is
such a thing as the right of free speech, then it is a right that each
person has and that cannot be overridden by the interests of a lot of
other people. If somebody wants to get up on a soapbox and preach
the Nazi ideology, and if there really is such a thing as the right of free
speech, then he has a right to do so even if a thousand other people will
become extremely upset when he does.
An aggregative moral claim is the kind of thing that you settle by
majority rule. If a township with limited funds has to decide whether
to build a swimming pool or to build tennis courts, it makes perfect
sense to ask whether more people want swimming pools than want ten-
nis courts. You do not ask, "Is there some one person who will be more
crestfallen by the absence of a tennis court than by the absence of a
swimming pool?" There is not an individualized claim here. There is
nothing that resembles a right.
Now, how does this bear on the political dispute that I have de-
scribed? The difference principle, the most egalitarian position that I
mentioned, will accept a sacrifice of total general welfare, if necessary,
to produce greater equality in benefits. This implies that if there are
people who are really stuck at the bottom of this society-say, the most
impoverished ten percent-and if in order to improve their situation
taxes must be levied to have the economic effect of depressing by a
comparable amount the middle fifty percent, then such taxes are justi-
fied. They are justified, according to this view, because the claims of
the people at the bottom are claims of a particularly urgent nature,
Number 1]
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claims to the provision of basic needs that are not aggregatively compa-
rable with those of people higher up. They are individualized claims
that have the kind of status similar to claims of right such as the right
of free speech. They can, therefore, outweigh a larger aggregate of ben-
efits to those higher on the economic scale. The most egalitarian result
follows if you think of the provision of economic benefits on the indi-
vidualized model, which is widely accepted for the preservation of ba-
sic liberties, rather than on the aggregative model of tennis courts
versus swimming pools.
For rights like freedom of movement, freedom of work, freedom of
religion, and freedom of speech, most of us accept this individualized
form of the moral claim. These basic rights are thought to be immune
from infringement for the sake of general welfare and prosperity. Even
though broad infringement of the liberty to choose a place of work
might be a useful technique of economic control, it would not be pro-
posed as a permissible method. (Conscription, aimed at security rather
than welfare, is another story.) Does this apply in the area of economic
well-being? According to the ordinary liberal position of equality of
opportunity, it does not. It is not permissible to sacrifice the general
welfare simply to produce a lesser aggregate benefit to a minority at the
bottom because economic poverty of a nonextreme degree does not
have the kind of priority over the general welfare that, say, freedom of
speech and freedom of association have.
So the real issue, in abstract form, is this: We have a progression of
general moral claims from most urgent to least urgent. The question is,
first of all, how far into the area of general benefits do our moral claims
on each other go? Do they extend to economic benefits? And second,
at what point in the progression from most urgent to least urgent of
those claims do we draw the line at which they cease to be individual-
ized and become aggregative? At what point do we no longer say, "In
order to meet this claim for everyone we may have to sacrifice the gen-
eral allocation of benefits above that point?" We have, in other words,
the problem of a two-tier morality, with individualized claims compet-
ing against aggregative ones. Professor Freund put it very well when
he stated that the collision comes where it seems that a substantial sac-
rifice has to be made in general utility-in the welfare of the majority
of the society-to provide a benefit to those at the bottom, a benefit that
is thought to be more urgent even if there are fewer of them. And I
agree with him that taken literally, the difference principle, as Rawls
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defines it, is too radical. Aggregate welfare should be permitted at
some level of need to outweigh equality as a goal.
Let me close by taking up again the point that Professor Freund
made about one specific institutional influence on the discussion of
equality in American society: the importance of the courts. In the im-
plementation of its political morality, any society employs a division of
labor, and in our society the job of the courts is to insure that people get
what they are entitled to. They are guaranteed the enforcement of their
rights, whether those are constitutional rights, statutory rights, or con-
tractual rights. The courts, therefore, have to concentrate on these indi-
vidualized moral claims. But I think it is unfortunate that most of the
public discussion on questions of justice in this country is confined to
the courts and to debate over judicial matters. It is unfortunate because
it is accompanied by an absence of discussion on issues of justice in the
legislature and in the electoral process. The courts are not the only arm
of government that should be concerned with justice. We all know that
problems of economic justice and injustice are among the most impor-
tant facing contemporary society. And since there is a limit to the de-
gree to which the courts can, and even permissibly may, consider
general questions of economic justice in deciding individual cases, it
would be a happy development, I think, if the division of labor between
courts and legislatures were not taken to be coextensive with a division
between the consideration of rights and the consideration of interests,
but if, instead, considerations of justice-specifically, considerations of
how much equality is required for the provision of economic jus-
tice-became more a part of general political debate in this country
than they are.
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